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INTRODUCTION

This Article asks whether intellectual property (IP) law
should favor small innovative firms. I was motivated to analyze
this question by three observations.
1. Small innovative firms make crucial contributions to
technological progress and economic growth. Josh
Lerner surveyed the literature on firm size and research
& development (R&D) and concluded: "One of the
relatively few empirical regularities ...is the critical
role ...of entrants-typically de novo start-ups-in
emerging industries."1 For example, small firms
pioneered biotechnology and the Internet using
technology "developed with federal funds at academic
institutions and research laboratories." Robert M. Hunt
and Leonard I. Nakamura found that before 1980,
virtually all private R&D in the United States was
performed by fewer than 200 very large, established
manufacturing corporations.' But since then, small and
new firms have become an important source of R&D. In
fact, the growth in the private R&D intensity of the U.S.
economy after 1980 is entirely attributable to the
growing R&D intensity of relatively small and new
firms.4
2. American culture loves entrepreneurs.
David
Packard's garage, the birthplace of Hewlett-Packard,
has been honored as a historic landmark.' Thomas
Edison, Alexander Graham Bell, Henry Ford, Steve
Jobs, and Bill Gates are featured in popular
entertainment.6
Likewise,
policymakers
love

1.

Joshua Lerner, Small Businesses, Innovation, and Public Policy, in ARE SMALL

FIRMS IMPORTANT? THEIR ROLE AND IMPACT 159, 160 (Zoltan J. Acs ed., 1999).

2.
Id.
3.
Robert M. Hunt & Leonard I. Nakamura, The Democratizationof U.S. Research
and Development after 1980, at 8-9, fig.2 (Soc'y for Econ. Dynamics, Working Paper No.

121, 2006), availableat http://www.repec.org/sed2006/up.12143.1138646305.pdf.
4.

Id. at 9. Hunt & Nakamura also found that, prior to 1980, when new firms

entered the market, they were less R&D intensive than established firms in the same
industries. After 1980, new entrants were more R&D intensive than established firms in
the same industry.

5.

National Park Service, National Register of Historic Place Listings (May 11,

2007), http://www.nps.gov/history/nr/listings/20070511.htm. For a discussion of the
"heroic inventor motif' in U.S. patent law, see Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 910-22 (2002).
6.

BIOGRAPHY-ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL (A&E 2005); BIOGRAPHY-HENRY FORD:

TIN LIzzY TYCOON (A&E 2006); EDISON: THE WIZARD OF LIGHT (Devine Entertainment
1998); PIRATES OF SILICON VALLEY (Haft Entertainment 1999); THE STORY OF ALEXANDER
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entrepreneurs.7 Received wisdom holds that small
business plays an especially important role in the
American economy in terms of job creation, and that
entrepreneurs are disproportionately responsible for
revolutionary innovations.8 Perhaps because of this
popular support and received wisdom, small business
enjoys special treatment by regulators,
tax
authorities, and government contractors. 9
3. Only a few IP law doctrines target small firms for
specific benefits; a few other doctrines have a
favorable differential impact on small firms." Two
examples in the first category are: the Patent and

GRAHAM BELL (20th Century Fox 1939); see also Jane L. Levere, Gates and Jobs, Together

at Last, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, § 3, at 2 (describing a musical featuring Bill Gates and
Steve Jobs).
7.
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special
Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L.R. 537, 543, 546 (1998) (stating that

"[s]mall businesses are a much more potent special interest group than large businesses,"
and discussing the "literally thousands" of statutes and regulations that have the effect of
favoring small businesses); George L. Priest, Small Business, Economic Growth, and the

Huffman Conjecture, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 2 (2003) ("In the United States,
largely for political and, perhaps, historical reasons, small business has attained a status
of veneration as constituting the most basic foundation of growth in the economy."
(footnote omitted)).
8. See Priest, supra note 7, at 2.
9. See Pierce, supra note 7, at 540-43 (noting that the government subsidizes
small business through (1) direct subsidies in the form of government loans;
(2) indirect subsidies in the form of preferring small business in the tax system; and
(3) indirect subsidies in the form of special treatment of small business); Priest,
supra note 7, at 2 ("Congress has enacted special programs involving small business
finance, simplified securities registration, special forms of tax treatment, and debt
relief, among many others."). Congress passed the Small Business Act in 1953,
'whose function was to 'aid, counsel, assist and protect, insofar as is possible, the
interests of small business concerns.'" Small Business Administration: Overview &
History, http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/history/index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2008).
10.
There are many definitions of small businesses. Probably the most common are
companies with fewer than 100 employees or companies with fewer than 500 employees.
See, e.g., Ronald F. Wilson, Federal Tax Policy: The PoliticalInfluence of American Small

Business, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 15, 28 (1996). Small business has also been defined in terms
of assets or sales. See Small Business Administration: What Is Small Business,
http://www.sba.gov/services/contractingopportunities/sizestandardstopics/size/index.html
(last visited Oct. 25, 2008).
The term entrepreneur also has multiple definitions. A common definition
states that an entrepreneur is a "person who undertakes or controls a business or
enterprise and bears the risk of profit or loss." THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 831 (1993). In the context of a discussion of IP law, it often makes sense to
adopt Baumol's definition, which emphasizes innovation. William J. Baumol,
EntrepreneurialEnterprises,Large Established Firms and Other Components of the Free-

Market Growth Machine, 23 SMALL BUS. ECON. 9, 9 (2004) (defining entrepreneur as "the
businessperson who recognizes the value of the invention, determines how to adapt it to
the preferences of perspective users and whose tasks include bringing the invention to
market and promoting its utilization").
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Trademark Office discount on patent application fees
for small firms and other small entities, 1 and the
copyright provision exempting small establishments
using "home-style" music equipment from the public
performance right of music copyright owners.12 In the
second category, the doctrine of reverse confusion in
trademark law and the availability of inherent
11.
The Patent Office reduces fees paid by small firms and other small entities.
"Establishment of small entity status allows the payment of certain reduced patent fees
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 41(h)(1)." 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(b) (2007). Patent application, issue, and
maintenance fees are generally cut in half for small entities (any individual, nonprofit
corporation, or corporation that qualifies as a small business under the Small Business
Act). 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.16, 1.18, 1.127 (2007). A list of fees is available at: United States
Patent and Trademark Office FY 2009 Fee Schedule, http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2008october02.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2008). The fee reductions
are about 1-10% of the attorney's fees paid for preparation of a patent application. For
example, a small firm might gain a fee savings of about $750 and incur prosecution costs
of about $15,000.
12.
The Copyright Act confers on music copyright owners the exclusive right to
publicly perform their work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006). The small business exemption is
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2006). Retail stores, bars, restaurants, nightclubs, and
others obtain performance licenses so they can lawfully play recorded copyrighted music
in their establishments. In 1975, the Supreme Court confirmed a judicially created small
business exemption in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 162-64
(1975). The exemption survived major reform of the Copyright Act in 1976. The legislative
history justified the exemption in terms of the difficulty of enforcing the performance
right against numerous small businesses. Lydia Pallas Loren, Paying the Piper, 3 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 231, 236-37 (1999); Peggy H. Luh, Pay or Don't Play:
Background Music and the Small Business Exemption of Copyright Law, 16 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 711, 717-18 (1996). ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, the organizations that
administer most music performance licenses, frequently do not bother obtaining licenses
from relatively small establishments because of the transaction costs. See Gene M.
Grossman & Petros C. Mavroidis, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU: Would've or Should've? Impaired
Benefits Due to Copyright Infringement, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 233, 237 (2003).
13.
A trademark indicates the source of a product. Trademark law protects a
trademark owner from a competitor who imitates a trademark in a way that confuses
consumers about the source of the competitor's product. A&H Sportswear, Inc v. Victoria's
Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2000). The typical trademark
infringement case involves a claim of direct confusion in which a defendant (the "junior"
or second user) exploits the goodwill of an established "senior" user by selling products
with a trademark so similar to the established company's trademark that consumers
mistakenly believe the junior user's products come from the senior user. Id. For example,
a firm that uses Coca Cola on the label of its cola creates direct confusion. Reverse
confusion, on the other hand, occurs when a junior user, usually a large company, creates
a trademark that is similar to the senior (usually a small business) user's trademark and
generates consumer confusion at the expense of the senior user.
Reverse confusion claims are recognized under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
regardless of whether a trademark is registered. Id. at 227-28; Fisons Horticulture, Inc.
v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1994). Before the 1988 amendment of the
Lanham Act it was not clear whether reverse confusion was actionable under the federal
trademark statute. 2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 5.01(2)(a) (2008).
Reverse confusion is a relative newcomer to trademark law, and it is intended to
protect "smaller senior users ... against larger, more powerful companies who want to
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distinctiveness for certain kinds of trade dress are
both intended to benefit small firms. 4 Also, in patent
law, the United States maintains first-to-invent
priority rules and a one-year grace period to benefit
small inventors despite pressure to abolish the grace
period and conform to the first-to-file priority rules
followed in the rest of the world."
In view of the first two observations, I am surprised how
little attention IP law pays to small firms in general, and
especially to small innovative firms. The most recent example of
favoritism arose in 1998 when small business lobbied effectively
for the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, the provision creating
the performance right exemption. 6 In 1992, the Supreme Court
use identical or confusingly similar trademarks." Fisons Horticulture,Inc., 30 F.3d at 475;
see also SK & F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1067 (3d Cir. 1980)
(declaring that public interest favored the adoption of reverse confusion); Big 0 Tire
Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977)
(extending Colorado's "trademark infringement actions to include reverse confusion
situations").
In a leading case, Goodyear started selling its Big Foot brand tires after a small
competitor named Big 0 had already started using that mark for its own product. Big 0
Tire Dealers, Inc., 561 F.2d at 1367-68. Consumers were not deceived by Goodyear ads
into thinking that Goodyear Big Foot tires came from Big 0. They might have been
confused into thinking that Big 0 tires came from Goodyear. Although the cause of action
is now well established, it remains controversial because it is difficult to see any harm to
consumers in many cases, and the doctrine opens the door to opportunistic suits.
14.
A general trademark law principle requires that a mark must have the capacity
to serve in the marketplace as an indicator of origin. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992). In trademark law jargon, the mark must be 'distinctive."
Some marks are considered inherently distinctive and therefore eligible for trademark
protection as soon as they are created. Other less distinctive marks cannot gain
trademark protection until the owner establishes secondary meaning for the mark,
usually by showing sufficient advertising and sales of the product in association with the
mark. Id. at 768-69. The requirement of secondary meaning is applied without regard to
the size of the trademark owner, but in effect, it works against small business because it
is easier for big business to achieve the required level of advertising and sales. See id. at
775. In Two Pesos, the Supreme Court aided small business by relaxing the
distinctiveness requirement for trade dress protection. See id. at 774-76.
15.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). The small inventors' lobby also obtained an
exception to the requirement that patent applications must be published after eighteen
months. The exception delays publication until issuance if the patent applicant does not
apply for patents abroad. Small businesses are less likely to patent abroad and thus get
more benefit from this exception. See Janis, supra note 5, at 919.
16.
17 U.S.C. § 110 (2006). Despite intense lobbying by the music industry, bar and
restaurant owners successfully defended the exemption in 1998 when Congress fine-tuned
the exemption and passed the Fairness in Music Licensing Act (FMLA). Id. The Copyright
Act exempts all businesses that have less than 2,000 gross square feet excluding parking
(the threshhold is 3,750 square feet for food and drinking establishments). 17 U.S.C.
§ 110(5)(B)(i)-(ii) (2006). Furthermore, larger establishments are exempt if they use
"home-style" audio performance equipment. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2006).
The small business lobby succeeded in maintaining the exemption in 1998
despite its apparent violation of U.S. treaty obligations under TRIPs. In 2000, a WTO
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made a ruling they believed favored small business in the Two
Pesos trademark case, but just eight years later the Court
changed direction in Wal-Mart and expressed skepticism about
small business favoritism in trademark law. 7 The patent priority
rules and the grace period were placed in the statute in a
different era when all businesses were small, but in recent years
independent inventors have shown some lobbying muscle and so
far preserved these provisions." Considering the political clout
displayed by small business in other areas of the law, 9 this
seems like a meager payoff, especially considering that the

panel ruled that a portion of the exemption, § 110(5)(B), does violate the treaty. Grossman
& Mavroidis, supra note 12, at 234-35. The United States accepted the finding and
negotiated compensation with the European Union. After failing to reach an agreement,
the parties moved to binding arbitration. The arbitrators awarded the European Union
slightly more than $1 million per year in compensation. Id. at 240. The European music
rights owners are not pleased with this outcome and continue to press the United States
to abolish the exemption.
17.
Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 775-76. The Court stated: "[A]dding a secondary
meaning requirement could have anticompetitive effects, creating particular burdens on
the startup of small companies ...[and] would present special difficulties for a
business.., that seeks to start a new product in a limited area and then expand into new
markets." Id. A few years later, the Supreme Court limited Two Pesos by insisting that
secondary meaning must always be shown to gain trade dress protection over a product's
design. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215-16 (2000). The
Court in Wal-Mart was concerned about socially harmful trade dress litigation made
possible by a low standard of distinctiveness. Commentators have criticized the Wal-Mart
Court for abandoning the interests of small business. See, e.g., Christina Platt Hillson,
Note, Trade Dress Protection: When a Dress is Just a Dress According to the Supreme
Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 461, 476 (2001)
("Wal-Mart will serve to make it more difficult to make a showing of distinctiveness in
product configuration trade dress cases."); Jeff Resnick, Comment, Trade Dress Law: The
Conflicts Between Product Design and Product Packaging,24 WHITT'IER L. REV. 253, 288
(2002) (criticizing Wal-Mart for harming small business); cf Gary Myers, Statutory
Interpretation,Property Rights, and Boundaries: The Nature and Limits of Protection in
TrademarkDilution, Trade Dress, and Product ConfigurationCases, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 241, 254 (2000) ("The Supreme Court's decision [in] Samara very likely reached
the correct result, though it was probably unnecessary to establish such a bright-line
rule.").
18. The small business lobby has slowed harmonization of patent and copyright law
with the laws of our major trading partners. See Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are
the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1304 (2003);
Robert W. Pritchard, The Future is Now-The Case for Patent Harmonization, 20 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 291, 307, 309-10 (1995); Toshiko Takenaka, The Best PatentPractice
or Mere Compromise?A Review of the Current Draft of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty
and a Proposalfor a "First-To-Invent"Exception for Domestic Applicants, 11 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 259, 348 (2003). See generally Donald W. Banner, Patent Law Harmonization 1
U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 9 (1992) (describing the history and probable future of patent
law harmonization).
19.
Mark Janis lists a number of instances where the small inventor has been
concretely favored in proposed and enacted patent law. Janis, supra note 5, at 918 n.79.
He does not make the comparison that I do to the success of small business in other areas
of the law, and so I am not sure whether or not he would agree with my assessment.
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instances of trademark and copyright favoritism offer little
advantage to high-tech firms.
I am not sure why small business concerns have not had
more influence on IP law. Perhaps the sentiment prevailing in
antitrust law spilled over into IP law. American antitrust law
has reached a near consensus that small firms get no special
treatment under a law designed to protect competition, not
competitors. ° In contrast, European competition law regulators
are more likely to protect small business, and European patent
policymakers openly fret about how to reform their patent law to
promote small business.2 '
Regardless, my concern in this Article is mostly with the
normative question: Should IP law favor small firms or give them
any special attention? I will limit my discussion mainly to
features of the law that are especially important to research
intensive firms. My analysis distinguishes invention in small
firms from innovation by small firms. I argue that IP law should
do little to aid small firms as inventors, but possibly some
favoritism toward small firms as innovators is appropriate. I lack
the necessary empirical evidence to make a solid case for any sort
of favoritism, but there are some good arguments for using IP
law, not antitrust law, to protect small, high-tech firms from
opportunistic and anticompetitive IP lawsuits. In contrast, I find
little reason to put a thumb on the scale in favor of small firms
when considering patent reform.
I assess favoritism in terms of traditional notions of
economic efficiency. Thus, I will not consider arguments about
distribution, localism, or democracy that might support
intervention on behalf of small firms. None of these arguments
seem especially strong in this context.
Efficiency arguments for special treatment are built from
claims that market frictions have a differential effect on small
innovative firms and that these frictions can be eased by
designing proper IP policy. In other words, optimal policy can
level the playing field. I will consider whether the playing field
needs leveling because of technology market, capital market, and

20.
See KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 40-42 (2003) ("Important modem cases.., have clearly placed the consumer
welfare goal ahead of the atomism goal.").
21.
George Stephanov Georgiev, Contagious Efficiency: The Growing Reliance on
U.S.-Style Antitrust Settlements in EU Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 971, 979-80 (noting the
difference between European and American concern for small business within competition
law).
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labor market frictions, or because of strategic dangers created by
anticompetitive use of IP.
One must be careful to recognize that large firms often enjoy
advantages because of econonomies of scale and scope, and from
the knowledge the firm has accumulated through previous R&D.
These are not frictions that should be overcome. An argument for
special attention to small firms only makes sense when they are
"naturally" better at inventing or innovating and would dominate
those activities but for the frictions. Economic histories of
technology usually contend that from roughly 1880 to 1980,
American R&D moved steadily away from independent inventors
and small firms into big-firm R&D labs because of scale and
scope effects and the importance of tacit knowledge."
A tentative case for favoritism must overcome the usual
arguments against fine-tuning the law. Tailored laws tend to be
more costly to write and administer, generate unforeseen harms,
and exacerbate problems of rent-seeking. Some of the examples
of favoritism mentioned above have performed poorly. Favoritism
in trade dress law facilitates opportunistic and anticompetitive
trademark lawsuits. The first-to-invent priority rule apparently
does nothing to help small inventors, though it is costly and does
benefit the patent bar.23 Much of the small business lobbying on
IP issues probably promotes the interests of the IP bar more
effectively than the interests of entrepreneurs.
II. INVENTION, INNOVATION, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Clear definitions are the first step toward a better
understanding of the relationship between IP law, invention, and
entrepreneurship. Economists
often distinguish between

22. See Hunt & Nakamura, supra note 3,at 1, 19 (explaining that large economic
participants dominated R&D until 1980 because there were barriers to entry such as
large investment costs).
23. See Lemley & Chien, supra note 18, at 1332 (looking at the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office interference proceedings over the first-to-invent doctrine to decide
whether small inventors are disproportionately benefited by the doctrine, and finding that
although the evidence is apparently mixed, ultimately the doctrine does not particularly
benefit small inventors (citing Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The First-to-Invent System Has
ProvidedNo Advantage to Small Entities, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 514 (2005)

(generally finding same, but also finding that small entities were advantaged in certain
circumstances))); Lerner, supra note 1, at 165-66 (arguing that interferences are
complicated and expensive and the first-to-file rule is unlikely to benefit small inventors,
and that the patent bar has been a powerful lobby working to preserve the current
priority system); Bryan J. Massey, Comment, Reasonable Royalties for 18-Month Patent
Publication Infringement: An UnreasonableRemedy for Small Businesses, 8 J. SMALL &

EMERGING Bus. L. 87, 99-100 (2004) (arguing that provisional applications are relatively
expensive and not that helpful to small businesses).
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invention and innovation. Invention refers to a technical
achievement, and innovation refers to development and
commercialization of an invention.24 Entrepreneur has three
different meanings in economics. The broadest definition, which
is often used in empirical work, is a nonfarm, self-employed
worker.25 More commonly, an entrepreneur is defined as a person
responsible for finding a new business opportunity and
establishing a new business to profit from that opportunity. 6 The
narrower definition that I generally use in this Article modifies
the common definition by requiring the new business to
implement new technology.27 Thus, an entrepreneur is an
innovator; an entrepreneur starts a new business to
commercialize an invention.
IP policy should be formulated in a way that recognizes
invention and innovation are distinct; they are often done by
different people in different organizations, separated by great
time and distance." Invention and innovation are sometimes
entangled because innovation often uncovers new technical
problems and suggests inventions that improve the technology
that is the subject of the innovation. Entrepreneurs often engage
in some inventive activity, but it is misleading to collapse the
notion of inventor and innovator.29 For example, Jobs and
Wozniak at Apple, and Gates at Microsoft are great innovators,

24.
For a careful discussion of the distinction between invention and innovation and
a description of commercialization activities, see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707-09 (2001)
(distinguishing between an invention and what happens "before it can be profitably
exploited").
25.
See, e.g., Simon Parker, Law and the Economics of Entrepreneurship,28 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 695, 700-01 (2007).
26.
See, e.g., M.B. Neace, Entrepreneurs in Emerging Economies: Creating Trust,
Social Capital,and Civil Society, 565 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 148, 151 (1999).
27.
See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING
THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 57 (2002) (defining entrepreneur as a "bold and
imaginative deviator from established business patterns and practices, who constantly
seeks the opportunity to introduce new products and new procedures, to invade new
markets, and to create new organizational forms").
28.
Edmund Kitch documents the fact that significant time passed before many
famous inventions were commercialized. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function
of the PatentSystem, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 271 (1977).
Entrepreneurs who launch successful innovative firms are usually not technical
29.
experts, let alone outstanding inventors; instead, they tend to be generalists. See Edward
P. Lazear, Balanced Skills and Entrepreneurship,94 AMER. ECON. REV. 208, 208 (2004)
Lazear,
Edward
P.
"jacks-of-all-trades");
entrepreneurs
are
(finding
that
Entrepreneurship 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9109, 2002),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9109 (showing data that Stanford MBAs who
became entrepreneurs took a more diverse set of classes in business school and had more
varied job experience).
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but perhaps not great inventors. Bell and Edison, on the other
hand, were both great inventors and innovators.
Inventors, especially independent inventors, are often
credited with the leading role in innovation and economic
growth; ° they are certainly important, but their importance is
probably overstated. William J. Baumol emphasizes that
historians have documented tremendous inventive activity in
ancient Rome and in medieval China, but failure to
commercialize those inventions meant they made no significant
contribution to economic growth in those economies. 3' Economic
growth is fueled by innovation rather than invention, and
modern capitalism has succeeded because it fosters innovation.3 2
Some innovation is accomplished by entrepreneurs, but most is
accomplished by large firms.33
Many people argue that small innovators are more
productive than their larger counterparts and, therefore, good
policy should promote small research intensive firms. There is
evidence to support the predicate that small-firm R&D is more
productive,3 4 but, on the whole, the evidence is not so clear.35 It is
hard to perform clean comparisons because small firms and big
firms are likely to settle into different niches. For example, Paul
Almeida finds small semiconductor firms get relatively more
important patents in less crowded fields and large firms get
relatively more important patents in crowded fields of
technology. Also, much of the literature combines inventive and

30.
For a lone inventor discussion see, for example, Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the
'Fuelof Interest'from the 'Fireof Genius. Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1139-42 (1998) and Janis, supranote 5, at 910-22.
31.
BAUMOL, supra note 27, at 266-67.
32. Id.
33. See Baumol, supra note 10, at 10 ("[Seventy] percent of R&D expenditure in the
U.S. is carried out by private business, and most of this is provided by larger firms.").
34. See Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch, Innovation in Large and Small Firms:
An EmpiricalAnalysis, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 678, 687 (1988) ("[T]he greater extent to which
an industry is compoesd of large firms, the greater will be the innovative activity,
but.., increased innovative activity will tend to emanate more from the small firms than
from the large firms."); John Bound et al., Who Does R & D and Who Patents?, in R & D,
PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 21, 51 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984) (finding "a higher output of
patents per R & D dollar for smaller firms"); Charles P. Himmelberg & Bruce C. Petersen,
R & D and Internal Finance:A Panel Study of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries, 76
REV. ECON. & STAT. 38, 49 (1994) (finding that small firms account for a statistically
significant percent of technological innovations in the year and industries analyzed).
35.
See Pierce, supra note 7, at 551-52 (observing that numerous studies regarding
innovation and small business are inconclusive); cf Jonathan M. Barnett, Private
Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDoZo L. REV. 1251, 1288-89 (discussing evidence
showing small firms are more innovative and concluding they probably are, though the
evidence is mixed).
36.
Paul Almeida, Semiconductor Startups and the Exploration of New
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innovative activity, so we do not have a clear picture of relative
productivity in the separate activities.
I have already mentioned that on theoretical grounds large
firms should be more productive at invention because of
economies of scale and scope and their stock of tacit research
knowledge." They should be more productive at innovation for
similar reasons and because of the complementary assets they
control. Other theories point in the opposite direction and
suggest small inventors and innovators are likely to be more
productive.3 8 One argument suggests entrepreneurs have much
stronger incentives (perhaps including stronger nonpecuniary
rewards) than employees in large firms.3 9 Inventors at small
firms are likely to receive a larger share of the profits from their
inventions than do the R&D employees of large firms." As long
as the independent inventor or small firm can realize comparable
profits (which is not necessarily true), then this means the
rewards for success will be greater for small inventors. Greater
rewards mean greater effort, all else being equal, and thus
possibly resulting in better quality innovations or a greater
likelihood of success.
Second, large, incumbent firms might be slow to develop
innovations that threaten to "cannibalize" existing markets.
Industry entrants and outsiders are not concerned about
displacing existing product lines and thus have stronger
incentives to develop technologies that replace older technologies.
The theoretical literature that has developed this point is
inconclusive, though, because in some cases incumbent firms will

Technological Territory,in ARE SMALL FIRMS IMPORTANT? THEIR ROLE AND IMPACT, supra

note 1, at 39, 41-42.
37.
See F.M. Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 16, 48 (Harvey J. Goldschmid, H.
Michael Mann & J. Fred Weston eds., 1974) (describing the controversial view that large,
monopolistic firms are best at innovation). Large firms enjoy economies of scale created by
the need for specialized staff and equipment. Further, they can diversify their pool of
research projects and diminish the effect of risks that could ruin a small company. On the
other hand, large organizations may be sluggish and risk averse. "Whether large firms
are in fact superior or inferior innovators depends upon how these various characteristics
balance out, and that is basically an empirical question." Id.
38.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
39.
See David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, What Makes an Entrepreneur?,
16 J. LAB. ECON. 26, 46-47, 51 (1998) (illustrating through statistical data that
entrepreneurs are happier and enjoy greater utility that regular workers).
40.
Cf Scherer, supra note 37, at 48 ("Large organizations are not always renowned
for their speed in recognizing good ideas, and this sluggishness may drive the most
ambitious creative individuals into smaller firms, where their proposals have a better
chance of receiving personal consideration by the top decision-maker.").
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innovate first to "preempt" innovation by potential entrants.4 '
Either way, the existence of potential entrants spurs
innovation. 2
Third, even if the quality of innovations from small
inventors is no different than the quality of large-company
innovations on average, there might be an important advantage
to having diverse sorts of innovators with different experience or
technical knowledge. Breakthrough innovations are sometimes
realized as combinations of previously known techniques.43 In
these cases, the probability of a breakthrough will increase with
the diversity of potential innovators. Often, historical accident
plays an important role in the origins of this diverse technical
knowledge so that even a large, multiproduct firm cannot
necessarily count on having experience with all the technologies
needed to make a breakthrough. Theoretical models have shown
that such "innovative complementarities" can dramatically
increase the rate of innovation,' much as biodiversity can
increase the rate of biological evolution. Michael Gort and Steven
Klepper find that industries are often most innovative when
many firms enter the industry.4 5 In these cases, small inventors
might add a critical element of technological diversity to the pool
of potential innovators attacking a problem. This might then lead
to breakthroughs.
Economists have long recognized that many small,
innovative firms face challenges commercializing
their
technology. Entrepreneurship is costly and risky." The failure

41.
Barnett, supra note 35, at 1292 (explaining preemptive patenting and
publication as occurring when "a monopolist [elects] to develop the drastic innovation
prior to any challenger, patent it or publish it (so as to prevent its being patented by
competitors), and then suppress or postpone the innovation's market introduction").
42.
See Almeida, supra note 36, at 40 (noting conventional explanation that large
firms are less productive in R&D because inflexibility discourages radical innovation); see
also Barnett, supra note 35, at 1290-98 (presenting three theoretical arguments that
large firms are less innovative because: (1) large firms are loathe to replace current
products with new products; (2) managers in large firms are more cautious; and (3) large
firms are sluggish because of bureaucratic routines).
43.
See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 45 (1997) (contending that new entrants who
launched disruptive technologies usually included "frustrated engineers from established
firms").
44.
James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation 5
(MIT Dep't
of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 00-01,
2006), available at
www.sss.ias.edu/publications/papers/econpaper25.pdf.
45.
Michael Gort & Steven Klepper, Time Paths in the Diffusion of Product
Innovations, 92 ECON. J. 630, 651 (1982).
46.
Rajshree Agarwal & Michael Gort, Firm and Product Life Cycles and Firm
Survival, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 184, 189 (2002) (computing the likelihood of firm survival in
terms of "hazard rates" and concluding that small firm size has a "positive relation to
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rate of innovations given technical success is high, and the cost of
innovation typically far exceeds the cost of invention. High-tech
entrepreneurs are often hobbled by capital market constraints,47
strategic threats from incumbent firms, and limited access to
assets that are complementary to new technology like a
marketing infrastructure. Despite these frictions, which I will
discuss in detail below, the supply of entrepreneurs in the
American economy is abundant, and one goal of IP policy should
be to guide these entrepreneurs into productive, innovative
activities.48
The value of policy interventions that help high-tech
entrepreneurs may be greater today than it would have been in
the last century. Hunt & Nakamura present evidence that the
introduction of the personal computer spurred innovation by
small American firms after 1980. They contend that
computerization reduces the fixed marketing costs invested by
firms after they innovate. 9 Scale economies associated with
marketing are one of the main factors disadvantaging small,
innovative firms. Computers and the Internet cut marketing
costs and improved the ability of small firms to compete. This in
turn improved their return to R&D.

III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING POLICY EFFECTS ON LARGE
AND SMALL FIRMS

Policy assessment of small business favoritism starts by
noting who is disfavored. My interest is with policies that
arguably favor (or disfavor) small firms at the expense of big
firms that they potentially compete against. Thus, I am not
interested in the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, which favors
small firm music users at the expense of music composition
copyright owners. 0 Instead, I am interested, for example, in
trade secret policy that affects employee mobility and the ease of
starting a high-tech firm and in patent priority rules that
influence the probability that a small firm will win a patent race.
Policies that expand or contract IP laws can have a differential
hazard rates").
47.
David S. Evans & Linda S. Leighton, Some Empirical Aspects of
Entrepreneurship,79 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520 (1989) (analyzing the process of selection
into self-employment and finding evidence supporting the notion that entrepreneurs face
liquidity constraints).
48.
See BAUMOL, supra note 27, at 59-62 (characterizing entrepreneurship as an
input that can be guided into innovation or into rent-seeking depending on the law and
other institutional factors).
49.
Hunt & Nakamura, supra note 3, at 4, 14.
50.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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impact on big and small firms and, therefore, can be thought to
favor one or the other. Scholars have asked whether strong
copyright protection, especially in the digital world, encourages
vertical integration in entertainment industries.5 Meanwhile,
scholars often suggest the opposite is true about patent law.
Many have argued that strong patent rights have fostered
vertical disintegration of R&D, especially in the pharmaceutical
industry." But in the software industry, small businesses,
especially in Europe, have lobbied against stronger software
patents. 3
Recent discussions of patent reform emphasize the disparate
interests of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries on
one side, and the information and communication technology
industries on the other. Some of the discussion also notes tension
between
small
inventors
and
big
information
and
54
communications technology firms. How should legal scholars
assess patent and other IP policy that has a differential effect on
different industries or different types of firms?
A useful, but incomplete, method calls for analysis of the
total effect of policy change on inventive or innovative output, or
both. A particular change that helps one group of firms may hurt
51.
See Bradford L. Smith & Susan 0. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Property
Protection in the Software Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
241, 246 (2004) (noting that in 1964, dissenting in the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Commissioner Hersey expressed concern that
extending copyright protection to software would entrench a small number of dominant
firms).
52.
Supporters of big pharmaceutical firms sometimes complained about gene
patents that lacked utility and should not have been granted. Supporters of biotech
startups usually took the opposite position. Big firms resorted to self help by undertaking
what has been called the "strategy of the commons." They funded public disclosure of
human gene sequences to forestall patenting by universities and small firms. Robert P.
Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 188-90 (2004).
"According to one estimate, [Merck] spent several million dollars to preempt the threat
that patents would stall research projects that depended on gene sequence data." Id. at
188. Ten major pharmaceuticals formed the SNP Consortium, "intent on preempting the
emerging anti-commons problem." Id. at 190.
53.
Alfonso Gambardella, Paola Giuri & Alessandra Luzzi, The Market for Patents
in Europe, 36 RES. POLVY 1163, 1165-68 (2007) (discussing negative impact on small
software firms where strong patents disincentivize licensing, withholding complementary
assets necessary for innovation).
54.
The clash between big firms and small inventors was evident in the previous
decade, as demonstrated by the debate over then-pending legislation, which would have
forced publication of pending patent applications eighteen months after the filing, rather
than retaining secrecy until patent issuance. See generally John F. Duffy et al., Early
Patent Publication:A Boon or Bane? A Discussion on the Legal and Economic Effects of
PublishingPatentApplications After 18 Months of Filing, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
601, 604 (1998) ("[The early publication proposal is interesting because it exposes a
growing fault line in the patent community between large corporations, which generally
support the proposal, and small inventors, who tend to oppose it." (footnote omitted)).
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another. In theory, one can determine whether the expected total
dollar value of R&D goes up or down in response to the policy
change. Even if such a calculation cannot be done with any
precision, thinking about how the calculation should be
performed is useful.
Three ingredients are required for this recipe. The first is
easy to obtain: the fraction of total R&D spending by each of the
two groups. The second is a measure of the productivity of R&D
spending by each group. And the third is an estimate of how
much the policy change increases or decreases R&D spending by
each group. With these values in hand, the analyst multiplies the
three numbers together for each group, adds the products, and
considers the final sum.
To be more concrete, we could evaluate the total effect on
R&D of expansion of the set of software inventions that are
patentable subject matter. The first step would be to measure
total software R&D and the amounts done by large and small
firms. We would find that large firms do most software R&D. But
the interests of small firms could still matter quite a bit if they
are significantly more productive in the sense that they generate
more invention or innovation per R&D dollar, or in the sense that
they generate higher quality output. There is much controversy
about whether software patent expansion was good or bad for
R&D incentives, especially for small firms. An interesting
possibility is that greater patentability increased R&D spending
by small firms and reduced it by big firms. A critic of the
expansion would want to emphasize the large fraction of R&D
spent by large firms, as well as the negative effect of the reform
on the incentives of large firms.5 A defender would emphasize

55.
Large firms hold many more patents and are more likely to maintain them.
Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents 22-23 (George Mason U. Sch. of Law Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 27, 2005), available at http://www.law.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=gmulwps. Large firms own approximately 71% of
patents. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2128 (2000) (reviewing sample
of 1,000 patents issued during 1996-1998 and finding that 70.7% of the patents were
issued to large entities and 29.3% to small entities, of which 17.5% were individuals, 1.1%
were nonprofits, and 10.7% were small businesses). But see Scott Erickson, Patent Law
and New ProductDevelopment: Does PriorityClaim Basis Make a Difference?, 36 Am.Bus.
L.J. 327, 336-37 (1999) ("The [U.S. Patent & Trademark Office] tracks only statistics on
the number of individual inventors, not on small entities, per se. However, an
examination of more than 1,300 inventors listed in the May 27, 1997 Official Gazette of
the USPTO showed a full 50 percent of domestic patentees came from entities with one
thousand employees or less, or from the nonprofit sector." (citation omitted)).
Likewise, the value of large firm innovation is great. See BAUMOL, supra note
27, at 30-34 (implying routinized corporate innovation probably has greater social value
than entrepreneurial innovation, but both are certainly important); see also
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the greater productivity of small firms (if it can be proven) and
the positive effect of expansion on their R&D incentives. 6
The econometric evidence is not rich enough to perform this
sort of calculation with much precision, but perhaps that day is
not too far off. Here is some of what we know.
While computerization spurred small innovative firms, the
appearance of software patents may have slowed them down.
James Bessen and Robert M. Hunt found that the number of
software patents grew dramatically as subject matter restrictions
on software patenting fell away.57 "Critics of the increased
patentability of software have argued that these legal changes
will stifle innovation and competition by holding up the
development of technology that builds on patented prior art and
swamping inventors in patent infringement suits." 8 Firms in the
software industry acquired relatively few patents, however;
instead, most were obtained by firms in electronics and computer
industries known for stockpiling large arsenals of patents to use
as bargaining chips.59 Moreover, the firms that acquired
relatively more software patents tended to actually reduce their
level of R&D spending relative to sales."
Bronwyn H. Hall and Megan MacGarvie obtained mixed
results on the value of software patents.6 ' They analyzed the
stock market response to important court decisions concerning
software patents and did a cross-sectional analysis of the
relationship between firms' stock market value and their
holdings of software patents. They found the extension of
patentability to software was initially negative for software

CHRISTENSEN, supra note 43, at xv ("[R]arely have even the most radically difficult

sustaining technologies precipitated the failure of leading firms."); id. at 13 (determining
case study of the disk drive industry showed that "[tihe established firms were the
leading innovators not just in developing risky, complex, and expensive component
technologies ... but in literally every other one of the sustaining innovations in the
industry's history"); id. at 97 (finding little evidence that bad management or the "not
invented here" syndrome explained why established firms failed to adopt disruptive
technologies).
56.
When this method is applied across industries, it is important to adjust for
differences in the social value of innovations across industries as well as differences in the
productivity of R&D investment.
57.
James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J.
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 157, 181 (2007).

58.
lain M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, Entry, Exit and Patenting in the
Software Industry 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12563, 2006),
available at http'//www.nber.org/papers/w12563.
59.
Bessen & Hunt, supra note 57, at 162.
60.
Id. at 163, 168.
61.
Bronwyn H. Hall & Megan MacGarvie, The Private Value of Software Patents
30-32 (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12195, 2006).
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firms, especially for those producing application software or
services.62 They also found that software patents are positively
and significantly associated with Tobin's Q and that the market's
valuation of software patents increased following changes in the
U.S. Patent Office's treatment of software patents in 1995.63
lain M. Cockburn and MacGarvie assessed the effect of
software patents on entry and exit of firms from software
markets. They found that patents have a mixture of effects on
entry. After controlling for firm and market characteristics,
including market fixed effects, they found firms are less likely to
enter product classes in which there are more software patents,
more potential licensors, or more ambiguous property rights."
They found that the "stifling" effects of software patents
increased following changes in the patentability of software, and
that these stifling effects were greatest for small, young firms.65
However, all else equal, firms that hold software patents related
to the market are more likely to enter these markets, suggesting
that the decision to invest in IP depends on the contours of the
patent landscape in specific markets.
The picture that emerges from this empirical research is not
clear. I read it to suggest that expanding the patentability of
software inventions decreased innovation by large firms, while
the effect on small firms is not clear. Furthermore, the relative
importance of small firm software innovation is unknown.
Assuming one can make a convincing case that relaxing software
patent subject matter restrictions actually increased R&D
output, there are still other relevant policy considerations (that
apply to other sorts of small firm IP favoritism as well).
First, the social cost to consumers of more patents must be
evaluated. Second, patents may protect the crown jewel held by a
high-tech startup, but they also increase the rents dissipated in
opportunistic and anticompetitive IP lawsuits. A significant
number of small inventors have manipulated the patent system
to extract undeserved patent royalties from genuine innovators.
The patent term was adjusted in the mid-1990s to discourage the
practice of submarine patenting, whereby patent applicants
delay their patent application until potential defendants are
locked into the patented technology.66 Publication of patent

62.
Id. at 25.
63.
Id. at 28.
64.
Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 58, at 31-32.
65.
Id. at 2-3, 14, 20-21.
66.
See Robert J. Girouard, U.S. Trade Policy and the Japanese Patent System 7
n.16 (Berkeley Roundtable on the Int'l Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 89, 1996)
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applications was also justified in part as a means of reducing the
threat from submarine patents. More recently, the Federal
Circuit fashioned the doctrine of prosecution laches to discourage
abusive patent prosecution practices." Nevertheless, the decline
of the public notice function of patents and the expansion of
patentable subject matter to include business methods and
software have contributed to the success of "patent trolls"parties who obtain patent royalties based on weak or frivolous
infringement claims.6 8
Third, a variety of tax, 9 contract, and grant policies can be
used to promote entrepreneurship.° One government innovation
program that some economists see as very successful is the
Advanced Technology Program (ATP) of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, which provides subsidies to firms to
develop promising new technologies. 7' The private sector has
recently shown some interest in using prizes (or patent buyouts)
to stimulate R&D, and some policymakers are calling for their
use to stimulate certain kinds of pharmaceutical research.72
The Small Business Administration (SBA) oversees two
programs that subsidize R&D by small firms. These programs

(describing submarine patents as "applications that remain hidden from the public until
they are approved by PTO, sometimes decades after they are introduced," the "most
notorious" of which was the application for the patent on the basic microprocessor).
67.
Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(holding that, inter alia, the defense of laches in patent prosecution cases was neither
limited to interference actions nor abrogated by passage of the 1952 Patent Act).
68.
See InternetAd Sys., LLC v. Opodo Ltd., 481 F. Supp. 2d 596, 601 (N.D. Tex.
2007) (describing a "patent troll" as a company that "enforces patent rights against
accused infringers in an attempt to collect licensing fees, but does not manufacture
products or supply services based on the patents in question" (citation omitted)).
69.
Feld described at least two ways the federal tax system favors small
businesses: the corporate tax is progressive and businesses can write off the cost of
equipment up to a relatively low total dollar limit. ALAN FELD, TAX POLICY AND
CORPORATE CONCENTRATION 30-31, 49 (1982); see also Eric Toder, Does the Federal
Income Tax Favor Small Business?, 2007 NAT'L TAX ASS'N ANN. CONF. ON TAX'N,
availableat http://www.urban.orgurl.cfm?ID=411606. Economists have estimated that it
costs $5 billion annually to subsidize small business. See Wilson, supra note 10, at 68. On
the other hand, when considering legislation that affects small business exclusively, there
is some evidence that the amount spent is insignificant. Id.
70.
The federal income tax subsidizes entrepreneurship by individuals because of
the deductibility of business losses. See Leandra Lederman, The EntrepreneurshipEffect:
An Accidental Externality in the Federal Income Tax, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1411 (2004);
Julie Berry Cullen & Roger H. Gordon, Taxes and EntrepreneurialActivity: Theory and
Evidence for the U.S. 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9015, 2002),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9015 (noting the incentive to open up a business
to avoid taxes).
71.
15 C.F.R. § 295.1 (2008).
72.
Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation,
113 Q.J. ECON., 1137, 1163 (1998).
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support the complementary goals of encouraging R&D within
small firms and encouraging transfer of R&D from nonprofit
laboratories to small firms. The Small Business Innovation
Research Program (SBIR) sets aside "a specific percentage of
federal R&D funds for small business .... SBIR funds the
critical startup and development stages and it encourages the
commercialization of the technology, product, or service. . .."73
The Small Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR)
provides federal funds to support the transfer of technology from
nonprofit research organizations to small businesses.74 The SBIR
and STTR programs are open to any for-profit company that is
American-owned and independently operated. The principal
researcher must be employed by the company, and the company
size is limited to 500 employees.75 IP favoritism must be justified
through comparison to these alternatives.76
IV. FRICTIONS THAT ESPECIALLY HARM ENTREPRENEURS
The case for favoritism should be strongest when there is a
market failure that hurts small firms more than big firms. I
consider problems in technology, financial, and labor markets,
and also the threat of anticompetitive behavior by incumbent IP
owners.
A. Technology Markets
Scholars and business people frequently comment on
problems that afflict the markets for technology and IP licenses.
These markets often function poorly because the quality of
technology and IP varies enormously and is hard to assess. These
problems are aggravated by uncertain law, especially in the case
of patent law, where uncertainty exists about the boundaries of
the property right. They are further aggravated by the difficulty
of writing complete contracts and monitoring the performance of
the parties.
73. SBA, Description of the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR),
http://www.sba.gov/SBIR/indexsbir-sttr.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2008).
74.
75.

See id.
Id.

76. No doubt, these alternatives come with various offsetting social costs.
Procurement programs tend to reflect the idiosyncratic needs of government agencies,
especially the military, rather than the needs of society at large. Direct subsidy programs,
such as the ATP, might have difficulty "picking the winners" because government
agencies might lack knowledge about the technology that private firms have. Tax credits
reward low-quality R&D (and, to some extent, other activities relabeled "R&D") as well as
high-quality R&D. In addition, tax credits are of limited value to cash-strapped small
inventors.
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Independent inventors benefit from policies that make these
markets work better because they will be able to sell their
patents and technology more easily. Entrepreneurs get a
reciprocal benefit when they enter technology markets as
buyers." Of course, big firms also benefit from better technology
markets, but it might be that small firms benefit more because
big firms are more likely to integrate invention and innovation,
and thus be less dependent on technology markets.
Improving the performance of technology markets is a
daunting challenge. The informational problems are great and
solutions are few. The leading policy recommendation is quite
simply to make patents and copyrights easy to evaluate and
enforce by making patent and copyright law clear.7 8 These goals
are hard to argue with. My only noteworthy comment is that
small firms often push these goals more vigorously than others
because of the greater relative benefits they perceive from more
efficient technology markets.
The main controversy relating to technology markets is
whether market incentives are important in promoting the
University
inventions.79
of university
commercialization
inventions are often quite basic and distant from the
marketplace. Jerry G. Thursby and Marie C. Thursby find that
"only 12% [were] 'ready for practical use."'8 ° Because these
inventions require substantial additional technical development,
they may be particularly well suited for licensing to firms with
experience and resources for commercial development."'
Many commentators have credited the Bayh-Dole Act with
encouraging university patenting and improving technology
transfer from universities to the private sector." The Act
77.
See infra Part 1V.C (providing some evidence that entrepreneurs often develop
technology that they have obtained outside of their firm).
153 CONG. REC. S15,899 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
78.
("The courts have struggled valiantly to interpret the law in ways that make sense in
light of change[,] but that piecemeal process has left many areas unclear and some areas
of the law out of balance. So action by the Congress is needed, and needed urgently.").
79.

See KEITH EUGENE MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL

ECONOMY 202 (2000) (arguing that such incentives encourage university inventors to
"focus on inventions with marketable applications").
80. Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Enhanced University Licensing and the
Bayh-Dole Act, 301 SCIENCE 1052, 1052 (2003).
81. See id. (stating licensing may be needed when further development is required);
see also Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law,
Values and Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships,39 AM. BUS.
L.J. 187, 201 (2002) ("Technology licensing is the most common and straightforward type
of industry-university research collaboration.").
82. As Joshua A. Newberg and Richard L. Dunn state:
Another widespread form of industry-university collaboration is the spin-off

20081

INVENTORS, ENTREPRENEURS & IP LAW

1221

encourages universities to patent inventions made using federal
funds and to license those inventions for commercial
development.83 There are also many skeptics who contend that
the increase in university patenting since Bayh-Dole would have
occurred with or without the Act.84 Interestingly, proponents
make the case that "[t]he act was introduced to stimulate
entrepreneurship, increase the nation's productivity and to
compete more successfully with countries whose economies were
healthier at that time, such as Japan." 5 The original version of
the statute limited patent licenses to small firms, but this
favoritism was eliminated after a couple of years when licensing
restrictions were removed.
The Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson-Wydler Act86 (which
applies to technology transfers from the government) address
idiosyncratic problems that arise because the inventors are in the
government or not-for-profit sector. Reforms that address
systemic problems with technology markets are difficult to
fashion. I will return to this issue in Part V in my discussion of
patent reform.
B. FinancialMarkets
Capital market imperfections are the most nettlesome
problem facing potential entrepreneurs. s7 They have trouble

company .... Some institutions have adopted policies to encourage faculty
members to establish spin-off companies based on their research efforts.
Professors at Carnegie-Mellon University, for example, are allowed to retain
their university offices and make limited use of university facilities during the
start-up phase of their spin-off companies. Other universities encourage spin-offs
by agreeing to defer licensing royalties or to accept equity in lieu of royalties.
Newberg & Dunn, supra note 81, at 204-05 (footnotes omitted).
83.
Patent and Trademark Amendments (Bayh-Dole Act) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
See, e.g., Thursby & Thursby, supra note 80, at 1052.
84.
Jerome P. Kassirer, Financial Conflict of Interest: An Unresolved Ethical
85.
Frontier, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 149, 150-51 (2001); see also Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker,
Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed Biomedical
Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 461 (1997) (acknowleging the Bayh-Dole Act was
a response to the decline in industry); William L. Geary, Jr., Protectingthe PatentRights
of Small Businesses-Does the Bayh-Dole Act Live up tolts Promise?, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 10,
17-18 (1992) (noting that Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act "to establish uniformity in
the vesting of patent rights in inventions resulting from Federally-funded research, and to
encourage commercialization of the funded inventions").
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94
86.
Stat. 2311 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3717 (2006)).
87.
See David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, What Makes an Entrepreneur?,
16 J. LAB. ECON. 26, 33 (1998) (noting capital constraints are a primary impediment to
self-employment); Luis M. B. Cabral & Jos6 Mata, On the Evolution of the Firm Size
Distribution:Facts and Theory, 93 AMER. ECON. REV. 1075, 1075 (2003) (evidencing that
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raising capital from traditional sources because of "uncertainty,
asymmetric information, the nature of firm assets, and the
conditions in the relevant financial and product markets."8 '
Venture capitalists mitigate the harm caused by these frictions
by relying on greater expertise, gathering more information, and
monitoring more closely than traditional financiers.89 Venture
capital is the most important source of "external equity financing
raised by privately held technology-intensive businesses from
private-sector sources."9 But other nontraditional sources of
funds are also important, including angel investors9 1 and
government grants and loans.9 2
Embittered entrepreneurs sometimes call them vulture
capitalists,9 3 but the evidence indicates that American venture
capital and other institutions for funding high-tech startups are
remarkably effective.94 Between 20-35% of venture capitalistbacked firms are taken public.9 " A Samuel Kortum and Josh
Lerner study, analyzing twenty U.S. manufacturing industries
over three decades, finds that "venture capital is associated with
a significant increase in patenting."96 They argue that the
financing constraints affect investment decisions and slow the growth rate of small firms);
Robert Cressy, Are Business Startups Debt-Rationed?, 106 ECON. J. 1253, 1255 (1996)
(noting entrepreneurial survival is a function of capital); David S. Evans & Boyan
Jovanovic, An Estimated Model of EntrepreneurialChoice Under Liquidity Constraints,
97 J. POL. ECON. 808, 810 (1989) (examining entrepreneurial choice when liquidity is
constrained).
88.
PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 127 (1999).
89.
Id. at 130.
90.
Id. at 11.
91.
See John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A
Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising
Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 872 (2005) ("Angel investors are the primary source of
funding for a rapid-growth start-up's early-stage financings.").
92.
The SBA provides billions of dollars in capital to businesses. "SBA's current
business loan portfolio of roughly 219,000 loans worth more than $45 billion makes it the
largest single financial backer of U.S. businesses in the nation." Small Business
Administration, Overview & History, http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/history/index.html
(last visited Oct. 25, 2008).
93.
See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 88, at 1-2 (countering the distorted
perception that venture capitalists add no value and disrupt startups when they exit).
94.
The remarkable concentration of venture capital funds in Silicon Valley helps
entrepreneurs in that community quickly spread the word about vulture-like behavior.
The reputational cost could be high, and probably deters much opportunism by vulture
capitalists. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineeringa Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1087 (2003) (explaining how geographic
concentration facilitates information transfer of entrepreneurial performance).
95.
GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 88, at 6.
96.
Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contributionof Venture Capital to
Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 674 (2000). Kortum & Lerner find that "a dollar of
venture capital appears to be about three times more potent in stimulating patenting
than a dollar of traditional corporate R&D." Id. at 675.
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increase in patents is not because startup companies rush to get
patents to impress venture capitalists, or because the startups
divert potential trade secrets into the patent system.97 They
observe:
Venture-backed firms' patents are more frequently cited by
other patents and are more aggressively litigated: venture
backing does not appear to lead to lower-quality patents.
Furthermore, the venture-backed firms are more frequent
litigators of trade secrets, which suggests that they are not
simply patenting more in lieu of relying on trade secret
protection.98
The message of the Kortum & Lerner study is that venture
capitalists select good entrepreneurs and help them succeed with
both cash and managerial talent. The message is not that
venture capitalists like patents. The study uses citationsweighted patent counts as a proxy for the quality of the inventive
output of the firms."
Well, what do venture capitalists think about patents and
other forms of IP?
Patents, trade secrets, and copyrights (in the case of
software) offer rights to exclude that create incentives that
encourage invention and innovation. The incentive effect of IP is
felt differently by small and big firms. Small firms are probably
less effective at enforcing their IP rights. At the same time, they
are more dependent on IP rights to capture profit from their
inventions and innovations.
In the biotechnology sector, strong patents are usually
essential for venture capital funding 0 simply because only a
patent-based business model makes sense for most firms in this
sector-big or small. This sector is risky and filled with young,
small firms. "[M]ost biotechnology firms start out as venturecapital-financed 'spin-outs' from a university or research
institute ... .""' Biotechnology firms and venture capitalists see
more profit in stronger patents and favor court decisions that
push patentability upstream toward the academic science end of
the invention process.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 690-91 (using previous patents cited as a measure of quality).
100. See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability:
Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 122-23
(2001) (explaining how patents provide biotechnology startups one of their only assets in
the form of IP).
101. Id. at 139.
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Despite folk stories during the dotcom heyday suggesting
otherwise, Silicon Valley venture capitalists are not eager to fund
every startup with a thick portfolio of patents. Many of them
favor patent reform and some have even called for the abolition
of software patents.' ° Others contend that patents play the same
role in information and communication technology (ICT) that
they play in biotechnology.' °3 The academic research gives a
mixed message, but there is some strong evidence that patents
are much less important for a successful startup*in ICT than in
biotechnology. I will discuss this research in Part V.
C. High-Skilled Labor Markets
Many small innovative firms invent, develop, and
commercialize new technology from within. Others look outside
for inventions and key research personnel. The role of the BayhDole Act and the Stevenson-Wydler Act in promoting the
transfer of patents and technology to innovators has been much
discussed.' A more subtle legal influence on small innovative
firms was identified by Ronald J. Gilson and Alan Hyde. They
make an interesting case for restricting the reach of trade secret
law and covenants not to compete in cases that often pit a hightech startup against the firm that previously employed key
members of the startup. 5 Both argue that California law is
relatively more generous to startups than Massachusetts law,
and that this difference spurred more rapid growth of the hightech economy in Silicon Valley compared to Route 128 around
Boston.0 6
Specifically, Gilson & Hyde argue that strong trade secret
law and enforceable restrictions on labor mobility harm
innovative firms because they undercut technological spillovers

102.
See, e.g., Abolish Software Patents? Not So Simple, Posting of Rob Hof to Bus.
WK.: The TechBeat, http://www.businessweek.com/thethread/techbeat/archives/2006/
04/abolishsoftwar.html (Apr. 14, 2006) (quoting a venture capitalist who equates patents
to the nuclear arms race).
103.
Smith & Mann, supra note 51, at 258, 262 (noting that critics of patent
protection for software argue that patent prosecution costs mean patents would harm
small firms, and arguing that software patents help small firms get venture capital
funding).
104. See, e.g., James Stuart, The Academic-Industrial Complex: A Warning to
Universities, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1039-40 (2004).
105.

See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 32-33, 67-68 (2003); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal
Infrastructure of High-Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and
Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 593 (1999).
106.
HYDE, supra note 105, at 33; Gilson, supra note 105, at 578.

2008]

INVENTORS, ENTREPRENEURS & IP LAW

1225

that occur when employees move."°7 If the harm from loss of
spillovers exceeds the direct incentive effect. 8 from strong
protection of a firm's own research, then welfare is improved by
weakening both trade secret law and permissible restrictions on
employee mobility. Firms face a collective action problem and
would find it difficult to voluntarily implement a low protection
regime.0 9 This intuitive argument has been formalized in a model
by Andrea Fosfuria and Thomas R0nde."'
The Gilson & Hyde theory was motivated by case studies,
but economists have contributed evidence supporting the
assumptions that technological spillovers are important to
innovation and are strengthened by geographic proximity. For
example, patent citations are more likely between patents issued
to inventors living in the same location."' Iain Cockburn and
coauthors use patent-based evidence and find that social capital
facilitates knowledge spillovers."' Their finding complements
107.
HYDE, supra note 105, at 31; Gilson, supra note 105, at 578; see also Almeida,
supra note 36, at 43-45 (suggesting that small semiconductor firms overcome resource
limits by sharing knowledge with other researchers in the same geographic area, and that
some of this sharing is informal and often connected to social relationships, while in other
cases the sharing follows from labor mobility).
108.
Trebilcock argues in favor of covenants not to compete because they protect
human capital investment by restricting the movement of workers. See, e.g., MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 129-31 (1986); see also Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee
Training,and the Limits of Transaction-CostAnalysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 53 (2001).
In contrast, Paolo Fulghieri and Merih Sevilir develop a model in which
human capital investment is critical for innovation. They show firms benefit from
competition because competition creates opportunities for employees to depart with
human capital that would be valuable in a competing firm. The credible threat of
departure forces firms to share the profit from innovation with employees. The prospect
of sharing the fruits of innovation motivates employees to acquire skills to innovate.
See Paolo Fulghieri & Merih Sevilir, Innovation Incentives in EntrepreneurialFirms 27
(EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings, Working Paper No. 4160, 2004), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=558586. They report that empirical evidence shows that
innovative firms tend to operate in competitive industries. Id. at 2.
109.
See HYDE, supra note 105, at 50 ("[C]ontracts and labor market intermediaries
characteristic of Silicon Valley's high-velocity labor market exist in order to realize the
endogenous economic growth that comes from the production and diffusion of information.
Its contract and careers provide maximum incentives for employee production of
information; maximum diffusion of that information; and maximum absorptive capacity
in firms.").
110.
Andrea Fosfuria & Thomas Ronde, High-Tech Clusters, Technology Spillovers,
and Trade Secret Laws, 22 INTL J. INDUS. ORG. 45, 47 (2004); see also Eric A. Posner,
Alexander Triantis & George G. Triantis, Investing in Human Capital: The Efficiency of
Covenants Not to Compete 4 (Univ. of Va. Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ.
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 11, 2004).
111.
HYDE, supra note 105, at 58-59.
112.
Ajay K. Agrawal, lain M. Cockburn & John McHale, Gone But Not Forgotten:
Labor Flows, Knowledge Spillovers, and Enduring Social Capital 13-20 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9950, 2003), available at http/www.nber.org/
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sociological research finding that immigrant communities in the
Silicon Valley foster entrepreneurship and innovation." 3
Robert M. Hunt and coauthors study the dramatic variation
in inventive productivity (measured by patents per capita) across
U.S. cities."4 After controlling for the factors usually cited by
economists, such as industry mix, historical concentrations of
technology, and city size, they find other labor markets factors
are also significant."' Not surprisingly, the education of workers
is significant; in fact, it proves to be the most important
determinant of inventive productivity."6 But the density of the
labor market is at least as important in explaining inventive
productivity as city size. Finally, cities with smaller average firm
size are more productive at innovation."7
Hunt suggests dense labor markets filled with highly
educated workers and many firms are more efficient at
innovation because workers and firms are more selective in their
matching, which leads to greater productivity."8 The critical
question left unanswered by this research is the role of covenants
not to compete and trade secret law in explaining regional
variation in R&D productivity. Gilson & Hyde disagree about the
amount of variation across states in the substance of their trade
secret laws, but agree that there is significant variation across
states with regard to the enforceability of covenants not to
compete. "' At one extreme, California refuses to enforce such
agreements. 2 ° Massachusetts and most other states will enforce
them if they are reasonable-the factors that determine
reasonableness vary across states.' More research is needed to
link substantive variations in the law across states and over time
to measures of local spillovers, and also to analyze the nature of

papers/w9950.
113.
VIVEK WADHWA ET AL., EDUCATION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND IMMIGRATION:
AMERICA'S NEW IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS, PART II, at 2-3, 13-14 (2007), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=991327.
114.
Gerald A. Carlino, Satyajit Chatterjee & Robert M. Hunt, Urban Density and
the Rate of Invention, 61 J. URBAN ECON. 389, 390 (2007).
115. Id. at 394-95.
116.
Id. at 402.
117.
Id. at 401.
118.
Robert Hunt, Matching Externalities and Inventive Productivity 8-9 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila. Working Paper No.
07-7, 2007), available at
http./www.philadelphiafectorghsearch-and-data/publicationstworking-papersf2OO7/wpO7-7.pdf.
119. See HYDE, supra note 105, at 30-37; Gilson, supra note 105, at 597-98, 602-03.
120. See HYDE, supra note 105, at 64-65 (stating that California law "flatly prohibits
covenants not to compete, and gives no independent weight to negotiated trade secrets
agreements that reserve to the employer more than its rights under statute").
121. See Gilson, supra note 105, at 603-05.
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these sorts of lawsuits to learn if they could possibly play the
negative role 122that Gilson & Hyde asserted they did in
Massachusetts.
D. Anticompetitive Use of IP
Perhaps some tailoring of IP law is desirable as a way to
minimize anticompetitive lawsuits. IP law has advantages over
antitrust in terms of addressing anticompetitive behavior. IP law
sets ground rules for competition. It can be structured to level the
playing field in markets in which small firms face big
competitors. Antitrust law should play a secondary role because
it can only be used after the fact to punish anticompetitive
behavior. It is relatively cumbersome and creates serious rentseeking problems. IP law mitigates anticompetitive conduct
through the misuse defense and fee-shifting to defendants in
exceptional cases. These doctrines cannot generate the rentseeking costs associated with treble damage antitrust suits
because there are no damages available to motivate frivolous
charges of anticompetitive conduct.'23
Anticompetitive IP lawsuits may succeed because the small
firm defendant lacks the information to prove noninfringement or
invalidity. Other defendants may settle to avoid litigation costs
even though they are confident the plaintiff would lose the
lawsuit. In addition to gaining a favorable settlement, a
small competitors
dominant firm may use weak IP rights to deter
124
from using its IP because of the threat of suit.
Lerner develops empirical evidence showing the threat of
patent litigation has a significant effect on firms' research
agendas, especially small firms. 2 ' He and Jean 0. Lanjouw also
find that preliminary injunctions in patent lawsuits appear to be
used by incumbents to impose a financial burden on smaller
rivals.'26 They note the anticompetitive effect from the "particular
We will also explore laws regulating the portability of health insurance, looking
122.
for effects on employee mobility and personnel costs faced by high-tech startups. If we
find interesting variations across states or over time we will try to capture these
variations in data and fold them into our projects on the geography of innovation.
Further discussion of these issues is found in Michael J. Meurer, Vertical
123.
Restraintsand Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 187576 (2003).
124.
Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 521 (2003).
125.
Lerner, supra note 1, at 165.
126.
Jean 0. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary
Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573, 575-76, 595 (2001) (reporting empirical evidence that
the financial strength of the plaintiff is significantly correlated with the use of
preliminary injunctions in patent cases).
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difficulty of raising external funds to finance litigation.""7 And
they conclude preliminary injunctions in patent lawsuits were a
threat to innovative industries "driven by smaller, more
vulnerable, venture-capital-based firms" during the time period
studied.
There are plenty of anecdotes and opinions suggesting
strategic trade secret and trademark litigation also discourage
entry by startups. Patent lawsuits get most of the publicity, but
trade secret lawsuits are also common, expensive, and a threat to
solvency and venture capital funding.29 Kramer observes:
The trade secret lawsuit can be a devastating
competitive weapon, particularly against start-up or
marginally
financed
smaller
businesses.... If
a
preliminary injunction-even of limited scope-issues, it
places the defendant business at a serious competitive
disadvantage. Even though the scope of the injunction may
be relatively benign, the existence of such a court order may
discourage customers, lenders, and investors from doing
business with the defendant.
Crushing and intrusive discovery may be the next order
of business for the aggressive trade secrets plaintiff.... The
trade secret claim, regardless of its ultimate merit, can
force the defendant business to yield sensitive business
information to an aggressive and hated competitor and
hobble the defendant business by distracting its employees
and straining its financial resources."'
Even trademark lawsuits have been used to harass small
innovative firms.' In FerrarisMedical, Inc. v. Azimuth Corp.,
the court shifted fees to the prevailing small firm defendant
because the plaintiffs trade dress litigation was motivated by the

127. Id. at 574.
128. Id. at 575.
129.
Elizabeth Smith, Comment, Eliminating PredatoryLitigation in the Context of
Baseless Trade Secret Claims: The Need for a More Aggressive Counterattack, 23 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1095, 1099-1104, 1107-08 (1983) (noting the high costs of trade secret
litigation resulting from expert testimony, discovery, preliminary injunctions, and
possible loss of venture capital, as well as the harm from bad publicity and the difficulty
in winning summary judgments because of the inherently factual nature of the questions
involved).
130. Jeffrey W. Kramer, How Misuse of the UTSA Can Be Countered, L.A. LAW., Nov.
2002, at 17, 18.
131.
In a trademark case involving a large firm defendant, Wal-Mart v. Samara
Brothers, Justice Scalia observed: "Competition is deterred, however, not merely by
successful lawsuit but by the plausible threat of successful suit, and given the
unlikelihood of inherently source-identifying design, the game of allowing suit based upon
alleged inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000).
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3
desire to impose litigation costs and discourage competition.' 1
The product in question was a harness designed to mount
equipment on the heads of surgical patients. The defendant
Azimuth copied Ferraris's unpatented design, and Ferraris
responded with a frivolous trade dress infringement theory and
133
other frivolous trademark and copyright infringement theories.
Judges have some discretion to tailor the law to protect
small firms from anticompetitive conduct. The defendant's status
as a small firm is a factor that can be weighed in making
decisions about fee shifting and preliminary injunctions.3 1 It is
also relevant to the antitrust style analysis
that applies to a
3
misuse defense based on predatory litigation. 1

V. THE EFFECT OF PATENT REFORMS ON SMALL FIRMS
In response to complaints from the information and
communications industries, Congress has debated patent reform
in recent years; the House recently passed a reform bill, and the
Senate may soon vote on reform.136 The Supreme Court has
shown significant interest in patent law recently as well, and has
pushed the law in new directions in several important cases.'37
Certain critics of reform worry that many proposed reforms
will harm small innovative firms. They argue that patents are
crucial to small firms, that breakthrough innovations originate
with these firms, and that many of these innovations will be lost
if the patent system is weakened by reform. If the argument so
far is correct, then it is possible to argue that the harm caused by
patent reform to small innovative firms outweighs the benefit
that patent reform brings to others.
In my book Patent Failure with Jim Bessen, we make the
case that the patent system performs poorly when it fails to
provide the public with notice of property boundaries that are the

132.
See Ferraris Med., Inc. v. Azimuth Corp., No. CIV. 99-66-M, 2002 WL 1728225,
at *3 (D.N.H., July 24, 2002).
133.
Id. at *1-2.
134.
Meurer, supranote 124, at 526-28, 535-38.
135.
Id. at 543-44.
136.
TED FRANK, Am. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLY RES. ULAB. OUTLOOK, THERE IS A
ROLE FOR CONGRESS IN PATENT LITIGATION REFORM 1 (2008), available at

http://www.aei.org/pubhcations/pubID.27550/pub-detail.asp.
137.
See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2117 (2008)
(holding the doctrine of patent exhaustion applies to method patents); KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007) (reducing the threshold for a showing of
obviousness in a patent claim); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 776
(2007) (making suits over patent validity easier).
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hallmark of a properly functioning system of property rights. 38
We provide a variety of empirical evidence that patents work as
property when they provide good notice, and not otherwise.'3 9 We
show that the performance of the American patent system has
deteriorated in recent years because of misguided court decisions
that have weakened the notice function of patents.40
Concern about notice suggests certain reforms that reduce
search costs and make patent property rights more predictable,
more transparent, and more closely connected to the invention
actually possessed by the inventor. Possibly, some of these
reforms could limit patent scope or raise the cost of obtaining
patents. An optimal policy must find the right balance between
exclusionary rights and good notice. Let's consider how important
patents are to small firms (and their financiers) and whether
reform will harm them.
Many opponents of patent reform seem to overestimate the
importance of patents to small innovative firms. The evidence
shows that the average value of a patent to a small publicly
traded firm (less than 500 employees) is much less than the value
of a patent to a large publicly traded firm.' Carlos J. Serrano
estimated that small patentees realize only a 14% gain from the
sale of a patent.'4 2 In part, this is because frictions cause
technology markets to perform poorly, as I discussed in Part
IV.A. Survey data reveals that 39% of European patent owners
who attempted to license their patents could not find a
customer."' And when patent owners find licensees they
generally fail to capture much of the value of their inventions.
Richard E. Caves, Harold Crookell, and J. Peter Killing found
that, on average, licensors only receive about 40% of the value of
the rents earned on their technologies.'"
Small inventors suffer from fuzzy patent boundaries because
they realize less value from licensing or selling their patents.
Naturally, licensees will not pay more on royalties than they

138.
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 8-9 (2008).
139.
Id. at 11-16.
140.
Id. at 227-30.
141.
Id. at 109.
142.
Carlos J. Serrano, The Market for Intellectual Property: Evidence from the
Transfer of Patents 29-30 (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Houston Law Review), available at http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/-serrano/eco2404/
transferskelowna.pdf.
143.
See Gambardella et al., supra note 53, at 1176-78.
144.
Richard E. Caves, Harold Crookell & J. Peter Killing, The Imperfect Market for
Technology Licenses, 45 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STATS. 249, 258 (1983).
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expect to gain in profits from access to a patent. Litigation risk
attributable to weak patent notice reduces these profits. If, for
example, a manufacturer expects profit erosion because of the
risk of an infringement assertion by some other patent owner,
then the manufacturer will revise downward the royalties it will
pay the first patent owner. This means that although small
inventors might not be exposed directly to the same magnitude of
inadvertent infringement litigation risk, this risk reduces their
incentives indirectly. A similar argument applies to small
inventors who choose to bring their technology to market
themselves-once they invest in substantial complementary
production and distribution assets, they are at risk for significant
litigation costs attributable to inadvertent infringement of others'
patents.
Improved notice offers a second benefit to patent owners who
want to sell or license their patents: the negotiation process is
less costly, and the risk of bargaining breakdown is reduced.
There is some limited evidence that suggests patents can
facilitate licensing transactions when they have clear boundaries,
but not otherwise. First, patent licenses are more common in
interfirm alliances in the chemical and pharmaceutical
industries. " 5 These are industries with patents that have the
clearest boundaries, and maybe that clarity encourages more
licensing. Another study found that startups have more success
in the technology market if they rate patent protection as
relatively "effective." 46
Patent rents are a critical source of R&D funding for small
biotechnology firms and some other types of small innovative
firms.17 But the role of patents in promoting innovation by small
firms may have been overstated, and the metaphor of the
entrepreneur David armed with a patent sling to fight off an
incumbent Goliath has been applied too broadly. Bessen &
Meurer found that the average small publicly traded firm more or

145.
See Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The Structure of Licensing Contracts,48
J. INDUS. ECON. 103, 112-13 (2000).
146.
Joshua S. Gans, David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, When Does Start-up Innovation
Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?,33 RAND J. ECON. 571, 583 (2002) (observing that
startups are more likely to market their products in environments where patents
effectively protect IP rights and mitigate the threat of disclosure).
147.
See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical
Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 317, 324 (2005); Alan 0.
Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals,Developing Countries, and the Doha "Solution," 3 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 47, 60 (2002).
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less breaks even when the costs and benefits it derives from the
patent system are added up.'
Many socially important startups operate in nascent
technologies and usually do not compete directly with large
incumbents. Clayton Christensen writes, "Perhaps the most
powerful protection that small entrant firms enjoy as they build
the emerging markets for disruptive technologies is that they are
doing something that it simply does not make sense for the
established leaders to do." 49 When startups do face incumbents
they might be on the wrong end of a patent lawsuit.
Iain Cockburn and Megan MacGarvie examine the impact of
patents on early stage software firms.' ° They uncover evidence
that startup software companies suffer a delay in initial venture
capital funding compared to comparable firms if they operate in a
market characterized by denser patent thickets. 5 ' The
relationship between patents and the probability of IPO or
acquisition is less clear, but they find "some evidence that firms
without patents are less likely to go public if they operate in a
market characterized by patent thickets."52
The surprising bottom line that concludes this grim story
about the small role of patents in securing financing for most
small firms is that most startups do not rely on patents.
Cockburn & MacGarvie found in most segments of the software
market, 80-95% of the incumbent firms have no patents related
to that segment.15 Ronald J. Mann and Thomas W. Sager found
that just 24% of venture-backed software startups had any
patents at all within five years of receiving financing."54 The
figure was significantly higher (56%) for biotech startups,
showing that patents are quite important in that industry but
not so important
to gain venture capital funding in the software
5
industry.1 1

148.
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 138, at 143-44 (noting that patent profits in
excess of litigation expenses are offset by the relatively larger losses small firms suffer in
litigation and lower overall profits).
149.
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 43, at 210.
150.
lain M. Cockburn & Megan MacGarvie, Patents, Thickets and the Financingof
Early-Stage Firms: Evidence from the Software Industry 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
13644,
2008),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13644 (defining "patent thickets" and hypothesizing about
their impacts on market entrants).
151.
Id. at 41.
152.
Id. at 1.
153.
Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 58, at 50 fig.3.
154.
Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital,and Software
Start-Ups,36 RES. POL'Y 193, 197 (2007).
155.
Id. Mann & Sager reported that when they used a model that controlled for firm
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The patenting proclivity of startups persists through the IPO
stage. Bessen & Meurer measured "the percentage of firms [in
various industries] that had filed one or more successful patent
applications by the time the firm was first listed in Compustat, a
database of publicly listed firms."" 6 The sample contained "5,163
firms that were first publicly listed from 1979-1999."151 "For
R&D-performing firms, 50[%] obtained patents," with the highest
share being 67% in the instruments industry.' The shares were
below 50% in certain "high-tech areas, such as software,
engineering services, or communications."" 9 "Note also that the
share of newly public firms with patents did not increase
substantially" between 1995 and 1999 when compared to the
entire range of years from 1979 through 1999.16° "Despite the
great increase in patenting in recent years, only 37 percent of the
firms newly listed between 1995 and 1999 had any patent
applications at the time they went public.""' Relative to large
firms, small firms face two problems enforcing their IP rights.
First, they incur a higher ratio of fixed enforcement cost to
variable enforcement cost." 2 Second, they are more likely to face
liquidity constraints that influence enforcement activity."'

duration, they found "little significance to having a patent before first financing." Id. at
206.
156.
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 138, at 175.
By "successful" patent application, we mean that it resulted in a patent grant by
the end of 2002. This sample includes all newly listed firms; that is, it includes
some firms that are not start-ups, such as spin-offs. If we restrict the analysis to
newly public firms with fewer than five hundred employees, the percentages are
very similar. The sample of firms is restricted to those that are matched to the
United States PTO list of patent assignees and those for whom there is no
match.
Id. at 174 n.14.
157.
Id. at 176.
158.
Id. at 175-76.
159.
Id.
160. Id. at 176.
161.
Id. "In the business services/software industry, the share was 22 percent from
1995 through 1999 despite a major expansion in software patenting during the late
1990s." Id. at 176 n.16.
162.
For a general discussion of the fixed and variable costs of regulatory compliance
and the effect of these costs on small business, see C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter?
An Economic Analysis of Small Business Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 5-7 (2004) (noting that the fixed and variable costs of regulatory
compliance efforts per unit of size decrease when the size of the transaction increases);
James L. Huffman, The Impact of Regulation on Small and Emerging Businesses, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 307, 308-09 (2000) (observing that regulation has
disadvantaged small and emerging businesses) and Priest, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing
Dean Huffman's hypothesis that regulatory compliance costs disproportionately impact
small businesses).
163.
Patent prosecution costs also create disparities between small and large firms in
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Successful enforcement requires monitoring for infringement.
Large firms have a natural advantage in monitoring because
they have more employees and are likely to have more contacts
with competitors and chances to monitor for infringement that
are incidental to other activities. Also, a large firm with a large
collection of patents can spread shared monitoring costs over
subsets of related patents. Large firms with in-house IP lawyers
have an advantage over smaller firms in terms of management of
litigation and negotiation of licensing. Finally, big firms are more
likely to have a reputation for being tough litigators, which
increases deterrence and settlement licenses; conversely, small
firms are more likely to have weak reputations because liquidity
constraints may impair their ability to finance litigation. There
are many stories of small patent 1holders
frustrated by their
64
inability to profit from their patents.
Large firms depend less on IP to profit from R&D than small
firms. Large firms profit from the sale of complementary
products, from lead time, from contracts, and from technological
protection.' These sources of profit are open to smaller firms,
but they tend to get relatively more profit from IP.'
Firms
bringing a new technology to an established market are often
eclipsed by incumbent firms who imitate the entrant following a
strategy known as the "fast second."'67
terms of patenting. See MARY ELLEN MOGEE, SMALL Bus. ADMIN., FOREIGN PATENTING
BEHAVIOR OF SMALL AND LARGE FIRMS: AN UPDATE 3-4 (2003) (describing an earlier
study that compared a matched set of small and big business patents and found that
small businesses obtain fewer patents abroad because of the high cost of obtaining the
patents, and stating that small businesses obtain fewer foreign patents after controlling
for the technology field).
164.
See, e.g., DORON S. BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS: INTELLECTUAL PIRACY AND THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER, at xiii-xv (2004) (observing that Eli Whitney
brought scores of patent infringement suits to protect his cotton gin invention and
complained that he did not earn enough from the invention to cover his litigation costs).
165.
Rajshree Agarwal & Michael Gort, First-Mover Advantage and the Speed of
Competitive Entry, 1887-1986, 44 J.L. & ECON. 161, 173 (2001) (describing the first-mover
advantage and the benefits of lead time); Barnett, supra note 35, at 1251-52 (discussing
methods other than patents for capturing profit from inventions); James Bessen &
Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent
Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (noting that firms may consider "lead
time advantage, learning, complementary products, and secrecy" stronger incentives for
R&D than patents).
166.
Barnett, supra note 35, at 1255 (describing hardships for potential entrants,
and stating that "patent protection may be required in order to facilitate entry into
technology-dependent markets dominated by one or a handful of firms").
167.
For a discussion of the fast second strategy, see CONSTANTINOS C. MARKIDES &
PAUL A. GEROSKI, FAST SECOND-HoW SMART COMPANIES BYPASS RADICAL INNOVATION
TO ENTER AND DOMINATE NEW MARKETS 121 (2005) (noting that entrants following the
"fast-second" strategy can influence the "dominant design" through mass marketing);
DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG, TECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC
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The high rate of patent lawsuit filing by small firms and
independent inventors suggests they value patents more highly
than large firms. The patents of large firms are litigated about
one-third of the amount the patents of small firms are litigated.'68
Small business advocates claim this shows that small business
patents are more valuable.'69 But there are other explanations.
As mentioned above, big business might be more effective in
deterring infringement and, therefore, not need to file suit as
often. Or perhaps the label "small business" is too coarse.
Possibly, there are genuinely innovative entrepreneurs who fight
hard to enforce their IP rights, and there are also opportunistic
"trolls" who bring weak or frivolous patent suits to collect
nuisance settlement payments. 70

A study commissioned by the European Union recommends
that patent owners should be compelled to purchase insurance
covering the cost of enforcing their patents. 7 ' The suggestion was
motivated by the observation that casualty insurers in the
United States and Europe offer almost no insurance to either
potential plaintiffs or defendants covering patent infringement
litigation.172 This observation is surprising because casualty
insurers have a long history of insuring potential tort defendants.
In addition, there are robust markets for insurance against trade
secret misappropriation and copyright infringement lawsuits."'
GROWTH 214-15 (1989), David C. Mowery, Innovation,Market Structure, and Government
Policy in the American Semiconductor Electronics Industry: A Survey, 12 RES. POL'Y 183,
189-90 (1983) and David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications
for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing, and Public Policy, 15 RES. POLY 285, 285-86

(1986).
168. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents,92 GEO. L.J. 435, 466 (2004).
169. Small firms have certain advantages in patent litigation that offset the
disadvantages mentioned above. They have less reason to fear retaliation in the form of a
patent counterclaim because they operate in fewer lines of business than larger firms.
170. The highest rate of litigation per patent occurs when patent ownership is
transferred before the lawsuit. Allison et al., supra note 168, at 465. This might reflect
patent purchases by "licensing shops" who either are extracting full value from
underenforced, strong patents, or are extracting nuisance payments from weak patents.
Unlike typical small businesses, licensing shops and trolls have low litigation costs
because they have no business to disrupt and they are often owned by the attorneys who
bring the suits. Licensing shops and trolls also benefit from favoritism that juries show
toward independent inventors. See Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 69, 107 (2007) (documenting jury preferences for domestic individuals with
patents).
CJA CONSULTANTS LTD., PATENT LITIGATION INSURANCE: A STUDY FOR THE
171.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON POSSIBLE INSURANCE SCHEMES AGAINST PATENT LITIGATION

RISKS 49 (2003) ("Without a compulsory scheme the premiums would be high, the take-up
low and most tellingly, insurers would not wish to be involved.").
172. Id. at 8.
173. See, e.g., Anna Lee, Note, Insuring Cyberspace: Why Traditional Insurance
Policies are Not Enough, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 84, 88-89 (2001) (observing that
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Certain European policymakers
believe that small
innovative firms are especially harmed by the absence of
enforcement insurance. They reason that small firms are less
likely to patent because they foresee that they will not be able to
afford to enforce their patents.'7 4 They conclude that fostering the
patent insurance market will also foster R&D by small firms.'
These policymakers favor compulsory insurance as a strategy for
eliminating an adverse selection problem-insurance companies
recognize that those most eager to purchase enforcement
insurance are those who are about to assert a patent. 176
I am skeptical that the compulsory insurance plan makes
sense-certainly not in the United States, where notice problems
make effective underwriting incredibly difficult. The United
States is also different because the success of venture capital
funding means that enforcement insurance is essentially
provided by the financiers. Recall that Kortum & Lerner find
high rates of patent and trade secret litigation by venture
capital-backed startups. 77 Other creative schemes for financing
litigation are also developing in the United States.

Let me recap the effect of notice-based patent reform on
small firms. It is possible that reforms could increase the cost of
getting a patent and possibly narrow patent scope and value. It
seems very unlikely that this will cause much harm to small
innovative firms except perhaps those in biotechnology and a few
other sectors. The reason is simply that patents are not the
crown jewels many entrepreneurs might wish. Most startups do
not rely on patents for funding. Patents are not a great source of
value to the average small firm because small firms have trouble

large Internet service providers such as America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy may
have already obtained insurance against liability for copyright infringement and other
risks).
174.
Small firms without insurance may face liquidity constraints. Big firms can
spread the fixed cost of monitoring for infringement over a larger number of patents, and
develop reputational advantages from participating in multiple lawsuits, or settle more
easily. See Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property
Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 57 (2004) (describing the
extrajudicial resources available to large firms in resolving patent disputes).
175.
See id. at 45-46 (noting that the likelihood of costly litigation in order to enforce
patents may prevent "small firms from conducting [R&D] effectively").
176. See CJA CONSULTANTS LTD., supra note 171, at 51 (noting that "new patents
only should be covered [in a voluntary or opt-out insurance scheme] because of the risk of
bad cases dominating if existing patents are allowed to apply").
177.
Kortum & Lerner, supra note 96, at 675.
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enforcing, selling, and licensing their patents. If notice-based
reform is successful, it easily could be a benefit rather than a cost
to small firms because it will increase the value of their patents
in technology markets and reduce the probability that they will
fall victim to a socially unwarranted patent lawsuit if they
successfully commercialize their technology.
VI. CONCLUSION

Many policymakers and scholars believe small firms are
especially important to American technological progress.
Evidence on this point is not well developed, but they may be
right. Assuming the claim is correct, I ask whether IP law should
be tailored in some way to favor small innovative firms.
I start with a presumption against tailoring because of rentseeking, administrative, and other social costs. This presumption
can be overcome if there is some market friction that impedes
invention or innovation and that has a disproportionate effect on
small firms. Frictions in financial markets and technology
markets both might have a disproportionate effect on small
inventors and innovators. American law and culture apparently
have done a good job smoothing financial market frictions and
encouraging robust venture capital and angel financing of hightech startups. This success has not depended on any tailoring of
IP law. Effective financial and technology markets often depend
on secure IP rights, but not tailored rights. Perhaps small firms
have a special interest in strong and cheap IP rights because
they are more reliant on them than large firms are. The
empirical evidence does not support this view of the patent
system.
Frictions in the market for skilled labor and frictions created
by anticompetitive IP lawsuits may warrant some IP tailoring to
aid small innovators. I am not aware of small firms in their
capacity as inventors facing any problems caused by labor
market frictions of anticompetitive suits. But there are strong
theoretical concerns supported by some evidence that small firms
in their capacity as innovators must worry about these two
frictions. Tailoring could benefit small firms by according
employee mobility more deference in trade secret and
employment cases featuring a small firm defendant. And
generally, district court judges in IP lawsuits should use feeshifting to sanction plaintiffs who bring anticompetitive suits and
otherwise manage lawsuits in ways that minimize the risk of
socially harmful exclusion.

